UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-24-2016

State v. Williams Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43491

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Williams Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43491" (2016). Not Reported. 2779.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2779

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
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JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
)
)
JASON LEE WILLIAMS,
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NOS. 43563, 43491, 43492
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO.
CR 2012-19280
BONNER COUNTY NOS.
CR 2012-5344, CR 2015-1476
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
While Mr. Williams was on probation in two separate cases, the State charged
him with burglary. Mr. Williams pled guilty to the burglary charge and admitted to
violating his probation. The district court sentenced him to five years, with two years
fixed, for burglary. The district court also revoked his probation and executed the
underlying aggregate sentence of six years, with three years fixed. Mr. Williams appeals
from the district court’s judgment of conviction and judgment revoking his probation.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Bonner County CR 2012-5344, Mr. Williams pled guilty to six counts of grand
theft. (R. Vol. I,1 pp.160–61.) The district court sentenced him to five years, with two
years fixed, for each count, to be served concurrently, and retained jurisdiction (“a
rider”). (R. Vol. I, p.161.) Around the same time, in Kootenai County CR 2012-19280,
Mr. Williams pled guilty to one count of burglary. (R. Vol. III, pp.141–42, 164–65.) The
district court sentenced him to six years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(R. Vol. III, p.165.) The sentence in CR 2012-19280 was ordered to be served
concurrent with the sentences in CR 2012-5344 (collectively “the 2012 cases”). (R. Vol.
III, p.165; see also R. Vol. I, p.194.) After a rider review hearing, the district court
placed Mr. Williams on probation in both cases. (R. Vol. I, pp. 182–85, 188, 189–92,
194–97; R. Vol. III, pp.171, 173–76.)
On March 25, 2015, in Bonner County CR 2015-1476 (“the 2015 case”), the
State filed a Complaint alleging that Mr. Williams committed burglary. (R. Vol. II, p.342.)
The State also filed motions to show cause for alleged probation violations in the 2012
cases. (R. Vol. II, pp.250–52; R. Vol. III, pp.188–91.) Mr. Williams waived a preliminary
hearing in the 2015 case and the magistrate bound him over to district court. (R. Vol. II,
pp.366–68.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Williams with burglary. (R. Vol.
II, p.380.) On May 22, 2015, Mr. Williams pled guilty to burglary and admitted to

There is an electronic record and paper record on appeal. The paper record is divided
into two volumes, cited herein as Volume I and Volume II. The electronic record will be
cited as Volume III.
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violating his probation in the 2012 cases for using methamphetamine and committing
burglary. (Tr. Vol. I,2 p.6, L.21–p.8, L.15; R. Vol. II, pp.389–90.)
On July 21, 2015, the district court held a sentencing and probation violation
disposition hearing. (See generally Tr. Vol. II, p.3, L.1–p.14, L.9; R. Vol. II, pp.289–90.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Williams to five years, with two years fixed, for burglary.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.12, Ls.4–7.) The district court also revoked Mr. Williams’s probation in the
2012 cases and executed the underlying sentences. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.25–p.12, L.4.)
The district court entered a judgment of conviction in the 2015 case and a judgment
revoking probation in the 2012 cases. (R. Vol. II, pp.285–86, 291–92, 409–12; R. Vol.
III, pp.205–06.)
Mr. Williams filed Rule 35 motions, pro se and through counsel, for
reconsideration of his probation revocation and his burglary sentence. (R. Vol. II,
pp.294–95, 301–03, 416–17, 423–25; R. Vol. III, pp.208–09.) The district court entered
an order denying the motions.3 (R. Vol. II, pp.307–10, 429–32; R. Vol. III, pp.210–13.)
Mr. Williams timely appealed. (R. Vol. II, pp.296–97, 418–19; R. Vol. III, pp.215–18.)
ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Williams to five
years, with two years fixed, following his guilty plea to burglary?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Williams’s probation
and imposed the aggregate sentence of six years, with three years fixed?

There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry
of plea and admit/deny hearing held on May 22, 2015. The second, cited as Volume II,
contains the sentencing and disposition hearing held on July 21, 2015. The third
transcript contains an earlier admit/deny hearing held on May 4, 2015, and will not be
cited herein.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Williams To Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Following His Guilty Plea To Burglary
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court
imposing the sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Williams’s
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-1407 (ten year
maximum sentence). Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable, Mr. Williams “must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho
457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be
tailored to the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483 (2012) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at
sentencing, focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public;
(3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the

Mr. Williams does not challenge the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motions on
appeal.
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related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho
122, 132 (2011).
Mr. Williams asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends
the district court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment in light of
the mitigating factors, including his issues with substance abuse and dedication to
treatment.
Mr. Williams’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his
behavior, and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court
should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s [substance abuse] problem, the
part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives
for treating the problem.” State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of
substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in
mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5
(1981). Here, Mr. Williams began using marijuana at age thirteen, alcohol at age fifteen,
and methamphetamine at age seventeen. (CR 2015-1476 Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSI”),4 pp.23–24.) He would generally snort or smoke methamphetamine at
least two or three times a day. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, p.24.) Mr. Williams reported that his
mother “went to prison for making meth” when he was seventeen. (CR 2015-1476 PSI,
p.19.) A 2013 GAIN Recommendation and Referral Summary (“GRRS”) found that

There are three separate packets of confidential exhibits in this case. The first, created
for CR 2015-1476, is cited herein as CR 2015-1476 PSI. The second, created for
CR 2012-5344, is cited herein as CR 2012-5344 PSI. The third, created for
CR 2012-19280, is cited herein as CR 2012-19280 PSI. This third packet of confidential
exhibits is an electronic copy; the other two are paper.
4
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Mr. Williams met the criteria for amphetamine dependence. (CR 2012-5344 PSI, GRRS,
pp.2, 12.) Mr. Williams has maintained periods of sobriety in the past, but he
unfortunately relapsed and committed the instant burglary offense. (CR 2015-1476 PSI,
pp.5, 24.)
Mr. Williams recognized that his methamphetamine addiction causes him to
make poor decisions in his life, including criminal behavior. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, pp.24,
26.) In the interim between his guilty plea and sentencing, Mr. Williams completed the
Good Samaritan Rehabilitation Program. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, p.24.) A counselor in the
program described Mr. Williams as having “an incredible work ethic” and grateful for the
opportunity to get treatment. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, Good Samaritan Rehabilitation
Letter.) The counselor also stated that Mr. Williams took “initiative right away” to
accomplish the program. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, Good Samaritan Rehabilitation Letter.) At
the sentencing hearing, Mr. Williams explained that he was very appreciative of the
Good Samaritan Program and learned a great deal about how to overcome his drug
addiction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.21–p.9, L.22.)
Based on these mitigating circumstances, Mr. Williams contends that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Williams’s Probation And
Imposed The Aggregate Sentence Of Six Years, With Three Years Fixed
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation
under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a twostep analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho
102, 105 (2009). First, the Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms
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of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated
the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should be the consequences of
that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the determination of
the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Mr. Williams does not challenge his admissions to violating his probation.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.7, L.19–p.8, L.15.) “When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her
probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.” State v. Peterson,
123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Mr. Williams submits that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation
and pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy,
113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,”
however. State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to
give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and
supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to
revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127
Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct before
and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, Mr. Williams submits that the district court erred by revoking his
probation because his probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. As discussed
above, Mr. Williams completed the Good Samaritan program in the interim time
between the admit/deny hearing and disposition hearing. (CR 2015-1476 PSI, p.24,
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Good Samaritan Rehabilitation Letter.) Mr. Williams’s counsel stated that “the program
really affected him.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.5–7.) Mr. Williams set goals for the future and
learned “to be grateful” for the opportunity to change. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.21–p.9, L.22.)
Additionally, Mr. Williams had a letter of recommendation from a former employer.
(CR 2015-1476 PSI, Letter from Northwest Auto Body.) This employer wrote that
Mr. Williams was “an extremely diligent and reliable individual” and “one of the most
dedicated individuals I have ever met.” (CR 2015-1476 PSI, Letter from Northwest Auto
Body.) The employer stated that he would offer Mr. Williams a job in the future.
(CR 2015-1476 PSI, Letter from Northwest Auto Body.) This positive employment
history demonstrates that Mr. Williams was working to become a productive member of
society. In light of his rehabilitative progress on probation, Mr. Williams submits that the
district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate or, in the alternative, vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
this case for a new sentencing hearing. Mr. Williams also requests that this Court
vacate the district court’s judgment revoking his probation and remand this case for a
new disposition hearing.
DATED this 24th day of February, 2016.

_________/s/ _____________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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